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Concrete Digital Computation: what does it take for a physical system to
compute?
Nir Fresco
School of history & philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Fresco.Nir@Gmail.com

Abstract. This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical
system to perform digital computation?
Time and again cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation
simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ
this notion as if there was or is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to
perform computation, and in particular digital computation. Some cognitive scientists in
referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing’s notion of computability. Classical
computability theory studies what functions on the natural numbers are computable and what
mathematical problems are undecidable. Whilst a mathematical formalism of computability
may perform a methodological function of evaluating computational theories of certain
cognitive capacities, concrete computation in physical systems seems to be required for
explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon.
There are many non-equivalent accounts of digital computation in physical systems. I
examine only a handful of those in this paper: 1. Turing’s account; 2. The triviality
“account”; 3. Reconstructing Smith’s account of participatory computation; 4. The Algorithm
Execution account. My goal in this paper is twofold. First, it is to identify and clarify some of
the underlying key requirements mandated by these accounts. I argue that these differing
requirements justify a demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the
notion of computation in regard to physical systems. Second, it is to argue that despite the
informative role that mathematical formalisms of computability may play in cognitive
This is a preprint of the article appearing in the Journal of Logic, Language and Information. It is
reproduced with the kind permission of Springer-Verlag. The final publication is available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10849-011-9147-8.
A more recent version appears in Physical
1
Computation & Cognitive Science (http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-41375-9).

science, they do not specify the relationship between abstract and concrete computation.
Introduction
Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation
simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. Unfortunately,
it seems all too often that a clearer understanding of computation is distorted by philosophical
concerns about cognition. In this respect I am sympathetic to David Israel's claim that
computation proper (rather than just computability) has mostly been disregarded by cognitive
science. This, he argues, could be explained mostly by the reluctance to look at computation
“free of any admixture of direct concerns with issues in... cognitive science” (Israel 2002: p.
181).
Some researchers in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Alan Turing’s
notion of computability when attempting to explain cognitive behaviour. He modelled the
behaviour of human mathematicians in performing paper and pencil calculations. So the
motivation for cognitive science adopting the Turing machine (henceforth TM), rather than
other formalisms of computability, is clear. Still, classical computability theory studies what
functions on the natural numbers are computable, and not the spatiotemporal constraints that
are inherent to cognitive phenomena.
Any analysis of cognitive phenomena, which is based solely on mathematical
formalisms of computability, is at best incomplete. It has been proven that Emil Post’s
machines, Stephen Kleene's formal systems model, Kurt Gödel's recursive functions model,
Alonzo Church's lambda calculus, Shepherdson and Sturgis' Register machines and TMs – are
equivalent. They all identify the same class of functions, in terms of the sets of arguments and
values that they determine, as computable (Kleene 2002: pp. 232-233; Parikh 1998; Soare
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1996: p. 298). Indeed, computation (broadly interpreted) need not always be viewed as
computation in physical systems. The above mathematical formalisms can exist in a Platonic
realm and be independent of any particular physical implementation.
Whilst they could be useful as mathematical tools for evaluating the plausibility of a
computational level analysis of a particular cognitive capacity, they are of the wrong kind for
explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Concrete computation in physical systems
seems to be a more appropriate candidate for the job1. It is not in vain that the reigning trends
in contemporary cognitive science (whether it be connectionism or dynamicism) emphasise
the embeddedness and embodiment of cognitive agents. This is one motivation for examining
extant accounts of concrete computation, before we can make any sense of talk about
'cognitive computation', 'neural computation' or 'biological computation'.
Furthermore, even the notion ‘computation’ could be used to denote several classes of
computation. The traditional divide of computation into digital and analogue may be
insufficient with the introduction of connectionist computation, quantum computation,
hypercomputation and so on. Some recommend using the broader notion of ‘generic
computation’ to be all encompassing and include all these different classes of computation
(Piccinini & Scarantino 2011: pp. 10-12). These distinctions will not be addressed here, rather
my focus will be on digital computation only. In order to avoid confusion, hereafter the term
'computability' will be used to refer to the mathematical notion of digital computability; and
the term 'computation' will be used to refer to concrete digital computation as it is actualised
in physical systems.
There are many non-equivalent accounts of digital computation in physical systems on
offer. Amongst those are TMs, formal symbol manipulation, physical symbol systems,
1

For the purposes of this paper, I shall remain neutral on whether cognition can indeed be fully explained
computationally. This question can remain unanswered for now.
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algorithm execution, information processing, and the list continues. I examine only a handful
of those in this paper. 1. Turing’s account identifies the following key requirements: having
the capacity to recognise symbols, having the capacity to write symbols and store them in
memory, having the capacity to change states; and having the capacity to follow instructions2.
2. The triviality ”account” suggests that any (sufficiently) complex physical system performs
computation. 3. A reconstruction of Smith’s account of participatory computation entails that
the key requirements are the following: the situatedness of the computing system,
computational processes extending beyond the physical boundaries of the system, and the
system standing in semantic relations to distal states of affairs. 4. The Algorithm Execution
account identifies not only the execution of algorithms as the key requirement, but also the
existence of the right labelling scheme, a formal description of that system, and an “honest”
model that binds them together.
No novel account of computation is offered here. The motivation for this paper is to
examine the conflict among well-known accounts and argue that they entail sufficiently
distinct requirements for a physical system to compute to justify the demand that one commits
to a particular account when employing the notion of concrete computation. Whilst the focus
here is on cognitive science, this demand is unbiased. It applies just as well to biologists,
astronomers and anyone else that employs 'computation' as explanans for some phenomenon.
My first goal is to identify and clarify some of the underlying differences between these
accounts by considering their key requirements. The second goal is to argue that despite the
informative role that mathematical formalisms of computability may play in cognitive
science, they do not specify the relationship between abstract and concrete computation.

2

Strictly speaking, whereas Universal TMs (hereafter, UTMs) follow instructions, special purpose TMs need not
be construed as following instructions in an explicit sense. The distinction between TMs and Universal TMs is
further discussed below.
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Turing’s account
TMs from mathematical and physical perspectives
Turing was the first one to formulate a comprehensive theory of computability. Turing
(1936) analysed computability primarily as a mathematical concept, namely what functions
on the natural numbers are computable, but also from a mechanical standpoint: what can be
done by mechanically following a procedure. Although, he analysed (mathematical)
computability, rather than (concrete) computation, his account must be examined as the basis
for any possibly adequate account of concrete computation. He achieved a metamathematical
proof that the reiteration of some basic atomic operations is sufficient for all the operations of
mathematics at large (Agassi unpublished). In that respect, Post’s machines, Kleene's formal
systems, Gödel's recursive functions, and Church's lambda calculus also identify the same
class of functions as computable.
Still, these formalisms of computability are not examined under my analysis of Turing’s
account. They are subdivided (amongst other things) in terms of algorithmic versus nonalgorithmic models. Gödel's recursive functions, for one, are essentially non-algorithmic.
From a strictly intensional viewpoint, recursive functions and recursion theory do not analyse
anything about what computers can or cannot accomplish at all (Soare 1996: p. 307).
Recursive functions could also exist in a Platonic realm where mathematical objects exist
outside space and time. On the other hand, TMs and Church’s lambda calculus have an
algorithmic interpretation inherent to the computation of F(x). Despite being of great
philosophical importance how such different formalisms can be equivalent, this question is
not addressed here.
Abstract TMs could be described as follows (Turing 1936: pp. 231-232).
The machine has a head (a read/write device going along the tape) that is only capable
5

of a finite number of “conditions” (q1, q2,…, qn), which are called “m-configurations”
and constitute the machine’s states. This latter part is Turing's finiteness condition on
the number of states (Soare 1996: p. 292).
The machine is supplied with an unlimited running tape, which is divided into squares
and constitutes the machine’s memory
At any given time there is only one scanned square, which may bear a symbol (referred
to as a scanned symbol). This is Turing's finiteness condition on the number of
symbols scanned at any given moment (Soare 1996: p. 292)
The behaviour of the machine is determined by an ordered pair consisting of its state
and the symbol scanned
The machine can write a new symbol after erasing any existing scanned symbol
The machine may also change the square it is scanning by shifting it one place to the right
or left
The machine may change its state

It is important to emphasise that from a mathematical perspective a TM is an abstract
mathematical object that may be formally defined by the following 7-tuple (Hopcroft 2001: p.
319). TM = (Q, Ʃ , Γ, δ, q0, B, F) where:
Q stands for the finite set of states of the TM.
Ʃ stands for the finite set of input symbols
Γ stands for the complete set of tape symbols and is a superset of Ʃ
δ stands for the transition function
q0 stands for the initial state and is a member of Q
B stands for a blank symbol
F stands for the set of final states
6

So, from a mathematical point of view it is an abstract transition function that can exists
in the Platonic realm. The TM was originally introduced as a model of a human computer (or
mathematician) engaged in a paper and pencil calculations. It is figuratively described as a
machine that reads and writes symbols in the process of computing that function. But it is “no
more a machine... than a model aeroplane is an aeroplane, although like any model, its
theoretical utility lies in the fact that it has certain properties that stand in a systematic
relationship to the things it models” (Seligman 2002: p. 210, italics added).
Although a TM is an idealisation of a machine, it is a simple model of a digital
computer on which all real modern computers are based3. This model was so simple as to
facilitate building actual instances according to this design (Israel 2002: p. 193). Turing’s
analysis does not take into account important physical constraint considerations: a TM exerts
no energy4, it never breaks down and has an infinite tape. It was acceptable in the discourse
on what is computable, in principle by humans or machines to disregard such constraints.
Abstract ideas, such as Turing's, can often be developed in detail and acquire some empirical
aspects and win scientific status (Agassi unpublished). And indeed, the four requirements
implied by his abstract TMs5 should be viewed as regulative principles and be supplemented
to ensure that physical (computing) systems obey the laws of physics (as attempted by Robin
3

Admittedly, the later Register Machine formalism seems a more adequate model of the modern digital
computer, which manipulates data and instructions stored in registers, than the TM, which has to scan the data
back and forth along its tape (Soare 1996: p. 298).
4
And yet moving its head to the left or right, reading and writing a symbol on a square and so on are all physical
actions with causal effects.
5
Whilst TMs or UTMs are conventionally used to model digital computation, Robert Soare (2009: p. 387)
argues that the Oracle TM should be used to model online digital computation. An offline computing process is
defined as one that begins with a program and some input, and proceeds internally without any interaction with
an external device. An online computing process is one that interacts with its environment. UTMs and special
purpose TMs lack this online capacity, for they begin with a fixed program and fixed input and proceed without
further external input until they halt. The Oracle TM, in contrast, is typically a fixed program at the core, and the
Turing type oracle is the mechanism for communicating with the environment (e.g., a database). Be that as it
may, modern digital computers do not typically invoke any non-algorithmic “oracle” processes that guess the
right answers. Martin Davis (1958: pp. 20-24) proposes a different model of an ordinary TM, in the context of
relative computability, that can interact with the external world.

7

Gandy).
The key requirements according to Turing's account
According to Turing (1936: pp. 231-232) the key requirements for a physical system to
perform digital computation are the following: 1. having the capacity to recognise symbols; 2.
having the capacity to write symbols and store them in memory; 3. having the capacity to
change states; and 4. having the capacity to follow instructions.
The first fundamental requirement of Turing’s account is the system having the capacity
to recognise symbols6. Any computation executed by the machine cannot proceed without it
being capable of identifying the scanned symbol and responding correctly (erasing a symbol,
writing a new one etc.) based on that specific symbol. The Turing scanner moves back and
forth through the tape and scans finitely many basic symbols (Turing's finiteness condition on
the number of symbols, Soare 1996: p. 292). If the TM used infinitely many symbols, then
some of those symbols might be too similar to the others to be reliably distinguished from
them in finite time (Parikh 1998). And without the capacity to recognise the scanned symbol
its operation will be completely pointless. A TM unable to recognise symbols will not be able
to read symbols off the tape rendering it incapable of successfully completing its operation.
More specifically, this requirement may be broken down further into three conditions,
which were proposed by Raymond J. Nelson. He listed four conditions that an FSA has to
satisfy to count as accepting, and the first three seem to be essential for symbol recognition
(Nelson 1982: pp. 166-170). The first condition, universality and discrimination, is that the
automaton must be able to assign types to tokens (or universals to particulars) over a
potentially infinite domain. If an FSA can accept a particular symbol, it must be able to

6

Yet nothing essential hinges on TM's symbols being symbols. The only relevant property of the symbols is that
they are determined by perceivable properties (i.e., be recognisable) of the squares and can be modified by the
agent (Seligman 2002: pp. 217-218).
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discriminate it among many types over a very large (though finite) domain. Secondly, the
One-Token-Many-Type condition states that the acceptance relation be merely relational
rather than functional, namely that the FSA should be able to assign a token to more than one
type. Thirdly, the One-Type-Many-Tokens condition states that the FSA must be able to
accept the elements of a single type from any one of several disjoint sets of tokens7. His
fourth condition requires a token to be recognised, although its individuating properties are
degraded, by some means of correction based on the context etc.
Moreover, Turing's second key requirement is the system having the capacity to write
symbols and store them in memory. A TM reads symbols, but in order to perform non-trivial
computations it also writes symbols for intermediate calculations and printing the output. The
machine’s tape is a general-purpose storage, which serves both as a long-term working
memory and the input/output device8. Without the capacity to store symbols in memory, TMs
would reduce to finite state automata (hereafter FSA). For a TM is an FSA with a single
infinite tape for reading and writing symbols (Hopcroft et al 2001: p. 317). In the above 7tuple notation of a TM, only Γ and B are elements added to the 5-tuple notation of an FSA
and the transition function is of the type: Q x Γ → Q x Γ x {L, R} (where L, R stand for
moving one cell left or right on the tape) (Israel 2002: p. 193). Although FSA do compute,
their computational power is limited compared with that of TMs and UTMs, due to their lack
of a storage device (Wells 1998: 287).
Furthermore, according to the third requirement a TM could change its state or remain
in its current state in accordance with three following neighborhood conditions. Firstly, the
7

Unlike the first condition, the third one implies that there is a family of disjoint sets and one and the same type
is the type for every set of that family.
8
TMs must have input for their normal operation, but they do not necessarily produce an output. In the latter
case they accept the input, perform some operation and halt. Interestingly, a TM need not have a single tape. It
can have multiple tapes with a finite sequence of input symbols on one tape. Single-tape TMs are equivalent to
multi-tape TMs: any multi-tape TM can be simulated by a single-tape TM (Hopcroft et al 2001: pp. 336-338).
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TM can change the symbol only in a scanned square and then at most one symbol. Secondly,
the TM can move to a different set of scanned squares, but only within a certain bounded
distance of a scanned square. Thirdly, any atomic operation must depend only on the TM's
current state and the symbol in the scanned square (Israel 2002: p. 189; Soare 1996: p. 292).
The TM may be in any of a finite number of states formally denoted above by Q. The
machine could change its state as a function of its current state and the symbol just scanned.
However, the next state of the TM may also be the same state it was in. Again, this
requirement too is a characteristic of FSA, which either change their state or not depending on
the symbol read.
Finally, the fourth requirement is the system having the capacity to follow instructions.
A TM acts in accordance with a table of instructions (or a program), although Turing did not
explicate the mechanism that causes the machine to follow these instructions. But in the sense
that TMs are merely idealisations, it was not essential that he explicate such a specific
mechanism, which causes the machine to follow these instructions. An important distinction
needs to be made between special purpose TMs and UTMs. Whereas TMs can only be
construed as acting in accordance with instructions, which are hardwired (or implicit), UTMs
also follow instructions explicitly.
The capacity to follow instructions (or execute a program) is maximised in the UTM. It
is able to carry out every computation that can be carried out by any special purpose TM. The
UTM is the first conceptual stored-program9 general-purpose digital computer: the control of
the computer’s operation is achieved by storing an encoded program into its memory

9
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008b: pp. 55-56) argues that UTMs should not be deemed stored-program computers
contrary to the received view, since the machine’s tape is used as both an input/output device and a memory.
Also, he adds that Turing originally considered the machine’s internal state, rather than its tape, a memory
component. The TM’s internal states are merely short-term memory, and not long-term working memory that is
required for a stored-program computer.
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(Copeland 2003: pp. 5-6). The machine’s program allows it to perform different sequences of
operations and yields a powerful kind of computing systems, namely programmable systems.
The triviality “account”
According to the triviality “account” every physical object performs digital
computation. There is no fact of the matter about what digital computation is, and thus
everything can be interpreted to perform some digital computation. The two main proponents
of this view are John Searle and Hilary Putnam. Searle (1990) claims that even his wall can be
interpreted to implement the (now obsolete) WordStar program. Putnam (1988: pp. 121-125)
claims that every physical object is a realisation of every abstract FSA or a program. In other
words, every physical object performs any particular computation. This “account” is not an
account of concrete computation, but rather a consequence of both Putnam’s state-transition
account and Searle’s criticism of computationalism. It is examined here for completeness and
to resist conspicuous attempts to trivialise digital computation. If everything physical
computes, concrete computation ceases to be interesting in its own right. But it is far from
being trivial.
3.1 The interpretative characterisation of theories of computation
On Searle’s view, the characterisation of a process as computational is an external
knower-dependent characterisation. Searle (1990) asserts that some alternative definitions of
digital computation (as those suggested by Brian Cantwell Smith) emphasise (arguably
important) features, such as causal relations between program states, programmability,
controllability of the computing system and its situatedness in the real world. However, he
argues that even these restricted definitions (without addressing them directly) are not useful
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in overcoming the central challenge of syntax being essentially a knower relative notion10.
There is no fact of the matter about what constitutes a process being computational; this
depends on an interpretation external to the process, since it is not intrinsic to the process. On
his view, computational states of an object are not discovered within its physics, but rather
they are assigned to it. So any theory of digital computation would be necessarily
interpretative.
Accordingly, there is no fact of the matter about what constitutes computation. Searle
(1990) argues that on a standard interpretation of digital computation, for any object at all
there is some description of that object such that under that description it performs digital
computation. Further, for any program P, there is some sufficiently complex object such that
there is some description of that object under which it can be deemed to implement P. He
asserts that if a physical object has some underlying microscopic causal pattern in it that is
isomorphic with the formal structure of P, then that object implements P. Thus, on his view, it
follows that a big enough wall, for instance, can be deemed to implement the WordStar
program, because it has some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the
formal structure of WordStar.
3.2

Putnam’s state-transition account
In a similar vein, Putnam (1988: p. 121) argues that every ordinary open system is a

realisation of every abstract FSA. 'Ordinary open system' refers to systems that are open to
influences such as gravitational and electromagnetic forces that result in those systems
constantly being subject to change. In an attempt to criticise computationalism, Putnam is set
to show that all systems, which exhibit the same behaviour, implement the same program. So
10

Searle argues that computation is observer-relative, however, I choose to replace observer with knower to
avoid some potential epistemic implications. Rather than committing to an empiricist view, the knowledge of a
knower could be based on reason, sense-experience or both. This does not weaken Searle’s position regarding
computation being relative to rational agents (humans, Martians or dolphins).
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if computationalism were true, it would render (the once popular) behaviourism true (ibid: pp.
xi, 124-125). To advance his arguments, Putnam (1988: p. xv) identifies computational
description with functional organization and proves the theorem according to which in a sense
everything has every functional organization and thus also every computational description.
As the basis of his theorem, Putnam puts forward two principles that are crucial to his
proof: the principle of continuity and the principle of non-cyclical behaviour.
1

“The principle of continuity. The electromagnetic and gravitational fields are continuous,
except possibly at a finite or denumerably infinite set of points” (ibid: p. 121).

2

“The principle of non-cyclical behavior. The system S is in different maximal states at
different times. This principle will hold true of all systems that are not shielded from
electromagnetic and gravitational signals from a clock” (ibid).
According to the first principle, which assumes classical physics (ibid), the electrical

and gravitational fields are continuous. And according to the second one, every ordinary open
system is in different (maximal) states at different times. For Putnam, the maximal state of a
system is its overall state that describes the system's physical composition. In classical
physics, a maximal state is the value of all the relevant parameters of the physical system
inside the boundaries of the system at any given time (Buechner 2008: p. 137). The second
principle ensures that there is no ambiguous mapping (i.e., non one-to-one) of the physical
states of a system to its computational states. The natural clock constantly stamps the system
in such a way that the system cannot have a duplicated physical state and enter the same
maximal state twice.
On Putnam’s view, there is no metaphysical need for a knower to attribute a
computational description to a physical system. Instead, he proves the theorem that every
physical object is a realisation of every program. To accomplish that, Putnam (1988: pp. 12213

123) demonstrates that any physical system could realise any arbitrary FSA. He accepts that a
causal relation must be established between his construed computational states A and B.
Putnam asserts that the system being in A and constrained by its boundary conditions (when it
is in A) causes the system to move to state B. Given the state of the boundary of the system at
time ti, then it follows from his lemma (ibid: pp. 121-122) and the principle of continuity, that
the inner part of the system has to change from one state it was at time ti-1 to a distinct state.
Thus, the transitions between A and B are causal (Chrisley 1995: p. 409). Since a
computational state A is mapped to physical state space S1 and a computational state B is
mapped to physical state space S2, it follows that the system is either in state A or B at the
appropriate time.
3.3

The key requirements for a system to perform digital computation
According to Searle (1990), the key requirements are the existence of a knower and the

system being a sufficiently complex physical object. The former requirement is a
metaphysical one and Searle proposes a simple criterion to put it to the test: suppose that there
were no knowers, would there be any physical systems performing digital computations? His
answer is no, in a similar way that chairs would not exist except relative to some knowers,
who regarded them as such. Strictly speaking, chairs and other physical objects would still
exist; only no one would interpret them as functioning as chairs or performing digital
computations. For Searle, digital computation cannot exist without the existence of knowers,
who assign this feature to the system performing it. The broader consequence of his view is a
binary divide of all phenomena into knower-relative features and intrinsic physical features.
Digital computers, chairs and glasses are knower-relative, but molecular movements and
gravitation are intrinsic physical features. The latter would still exist even in our absence.
Moreover, Searle’s second requirement is of a physical nature, rather than a
14

metaphysical one: it posits that the system has to be sufficiently complex. Searle (1990: p. 27)
argues that for any computer program there is some sufficiently complex object and some
description of that object under which it executes that program (thus performing a digital
computation). But then he goes on saying that a “big enough wall” (ibid) would be
implementing any program, because it has various causal patterns of molecule movements
each of which is isomorphic with the formal structure of the program implemented. It follows
that his second requirement reduces to some arbitrary molecule movements in the physical
object coexisting with some arbitrary description. Any physical object consisting of a
sufficiently large number of discernible parts could be said to implement any program under
the appropriate description.
Putnam, on the other hand, does not subscribe to the metaphysical requirement, and
makes Searle’s second requirement stricter. Putnam makes two assumptions regarding
ordinary open physical systems and the individuation of physical states. The first one is that a
system cannot be assigned distinct computational states A and B at t1 and t2 respectively, if
the corresponding physical states at t1 and t2 cannot be distinguished from one another. Under
his interpretation of physical systems, if a system can be individuated into the number of
distinct state necessary to implement any FSA, then it is sufficiently complex (Chrisley 1995:
p. 411). His second assumption is that the physical states of those systems should be
individuated by their relative intrinsic properties and not temporally. This is implied by
insisting on the principle of non-cyclical behaviour that states that those systems are in
different states at different times.
Reconstructing Smith’s account of participatory computation
According to Smith (2002: p. 24; 2010: p. 38) there will never be a satisfactory and
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intellectually productive theory of computation. Nevertheless, in the following sections I
propose an outline of a possible account of computation that could be reconstructed from
Smith’s view of participatory computation. This reconstructed account is based on the
following key requirements:
1. The situatedness of the computing system;
2. The internal states of the computing system operating effectively, but
computational processes also extending beyond the physical boundaries of the
system;
3. The system standing in semantic relations to distal states of affairs.
Firstly, Smith (2002: p. 37; 2010: p. 17) argues that computers are concrete, situated
entities that participatorily engage and can do real work in the material world. Computational
systems like those, which underlie modern real-time embedded operating systems in packet
routers that relay Internet traffic around the world or aircraft navigation systems that guide
planes and pilots in the sky everyday, are as concrete and situated as it gets (Smith 2010: p.
9). Real-world computing systems11 are extended to include a variety of peripheral modules,
which are controlled by the computer’s operating system, such as keyboards, screens, printers,
hardware cables, network cables and so on. These all function as transducers through which
the computing system actively interacts with the world that indiscriminately includes it (Smith
2002: p. 37). The traditional physical boundaries of a computer do not block it from
interacting with the environment, in which it is situated, in such a manner that its internal
operation is also dependent on input from that environment (Smith unpublished).
Interestingly, Smith's first requirement is also Andrew Wells' goal in arguing that it is

11

Smith (1996: p. 69; 2002) advocates three evaluation criteria for computation. One of these criteria is the
empirical criterion, which methodologically mandates that an adequate analysis must do justice to computational
practice: real-world computing systems (for a critique of Smith’s criteria see Fresco 2008).
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not a new paradigm of computation that is needed, but simply a better understanding of
Turing's analysis. He advocates an externalist rather than an internalist interpretation of
Turing's analysis of computation (Wells 1998: pp. 270-271). On his view, whilst the finite
state controller is part of the TMs internal architecture, the memory/tape mechanism is
deemed a part of the external environment. TMs are thus viewed as being irreducibly “world
involving” (ibid: p. 280), fostering an interactive approach to concrete computation:
computing systems are situated in and interact with the surrounding environment. Wells
argues that Turing indeed thought of the machine's tape as instantiated in a medium that is
different from the controller. This is because the human (computer) memory is limited by its
supervenience on a finite substrate, whereas the TM's tape is infinite (ibid: p. 282).
Secondly, Smith (2010: pp. 29, 36) asserts that not only do internal states of a
computing system operate effectively (roughly: they are causally influential); computational
processes typically extend beyond the physical boundaries of the system. The first part of the
requirement is true simpliciter for any physical process and computation is no different.
Whether one examines computation as merely a process or considers its physical actualisation
in a computing system, an efficacy relation obtains among the internal states of the process or
the system. This is how a computational process moves from its initial state and input,
through state-transitions to producing output and terminating at the final state. But the crucial
point for Smith (1996: pp. 70-71) is that a computing system crosses the physical and
semantic boundaries. The computing system involves causal interactions between and among
symbols (internal) and referents (internal and possibly external12) (Smith 2010: p. 29). Even if
we imposed theoretical boundaries between the system and the surrounding environment,

12
A traffic monitoring computing system, for instance, is affected by and affects the traffic on the road (as an
external referent). However, the Sun would be a distal external referent, which is not affected by or affects the
computing system (unless the system is somehow engaged in absorbing heat or light from the Sun).
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these would not be boundaries to the flow of effect (Smith unpublished). For instance, a
process, which sends a message across to another external system, will send a signal that
"travels" beyond the input/output boundaries and await an acknowledgement response.
In other words, for Smith (2010: p. 36), real-world computing systems need to be
analysed in the middle ground realm between the abstract and the concrete. The analysis
required here is metaphysical and one that has not yet been recognised by the natural sciences.
Computing systems need to be understood at a level more abstract than is traditional in
classical physics, but also at a more concrete level than classical computability theory.
According to Smith (1996: pp. 70-71; 2002: pp. 35-36), the physical boundary divides what is
internal to the computing system (e.g., registers, CPU, memory etc.) from what is external
(i.e., the environment in which it is embedded). The semantic boundary divides the realm of
symbols being manipulated during a computation from their referents, which could be internal
(e.g., instructions stored in the system’s memory) or external (e.g., salaries and other states of
affairs).
Although it is typically assumed that computation merely operates effectively on
symbols, this is a mistake according to Smith (1996: pp. 70-71; 2002: pp. 34-35; 2010: pp.
28-29). He argues that computing systems are concrete representational systems, which stand
in semantic relations to distal and other non-effective states of affairs. Computing systems cut
across both boundaries where manipulated symbols do not just affect internal referents (for
instance, a memory address and the instruction in the memory to be executed next), but also
external referents (for example, a numeral stored in the payroll database and a corresponding
numeric value of an employee’s salary). And this crossing of the semantic boundary makes
the computing system an intentional one, unlike a wall, for example. When a symbol is
manipulated causing a numeric value in the payroll database to change, all going well, this
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will lead to an employee getting a pay rise (or less fortunately, a pay cut) in the real world.
Moreover, the efficacy that constrains computation in computing systems has direct
consequences on the real world. Smith (2010: pp. 23, 29) argues that computing systems
embodied in the real world are actively involved in their subject matters, in being
consequential players in the very world they represent. In their operation they make effective
use of and affect the very states of affairs that their symbols semantically represent. Even a
simple example of a loop counter that returns as output the number of unique (type) elements
that were entered as input demonstrates according to Smith (1996: p. 71) the crossing of the
semantic boundary. The numeral ‘3’ will be returned as output, for instance, given an input
<‘dog’, ‘cat’ ‘mouse’, ‘dog’> following a series of effectively related computational steps. A
long downtime of a backbone mail-server, or an auto-navigated vehicle losing its set course,
exemplify how local internal states of computing systems have long-distance correlations to
some states of affairs by means of local causal efficacy (Smith 2002: p. 37; 2010: p. 36).
The Algorithm Execution account
According to this account concrete digital computation amounts to execution of
algorithms. Jack Copeland and Robert Cummins share this common view, although there are
some key differences between their interpretations of executing an algorithm13. Copeland
proposes a much more rigorous account of digital computation, which excludes noncomputing systems such as walls, clocks and planetary systems, but includes digital
computers, TMs and finite state automata. Cummins' (1977: pp. 279-284; 1989: pp. 91-92;
1996: p. 610) account implies that for a system to perform digital computation it needs to
execute an algorithm where its output and final state are a causal outcome of its input and
13

For Cummins (1989: p. 91) to compute a function reduces to executing a program. But his analysis and his
analogies to cooking recipes imply that for him an algorithm and a program are of the same kind.
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initial state. Copeland's (1996) account introduces further requirements: the existence of the
right labelling scheme as well as a formal description of that system, and an “honest” model
that binds them together.
On Cummins’ (1989: pp. 89-92) interpretation, execution of an algorithm reduces to a
disciplined step satisfaction, which can be given a systematic semantic interpretation. A
system computes if the underlying steps of the algorithm are satisfied in a disciplined manner,
which is determined by the appropriate causal connections that obtain between the steps and
the system. For Cummins, (1989: p. 92; 1996: p. 10) computable functions that are satisfied
by a process P executed in system S specify causal connections between steps in P and
between the final state of S and its initial state. If P satisfies functions f and g and f’s output is
g’s input, then the satisfaction of step f will yield the satisfaction of step g. S is computing the
addition function when the underlying steps it satisfies could be systematically interpreted as
addition. A function lacking two arguments, which could be interpreted as addends, cannot be
systematically interpreted as an addition function, for instance.
However, Copeland (1996: p. 353) argues that Cummins’ analysis of computation is
too narrow and falls prey to Searle’s trivialisation of digital computation. He claims that a
causal analysis of digital computation fails to encapsulate abstract systems like TMs or finite
state automata, which are paradigmatic computing systems. For instance, in a virtual TM,
which is simulated on a digital computer, no causal relations obtain between the contents of
the virtual machine’s tape and its actions. Yet, the virtual TM computes. Furthermore, it is
possible to show that on some formal description of Searle’s wall, the label-bearing states
satisfy the appropriate functions, and so the wall computes!
Consequently, Copeland proposes a stricter account of digital computation by adding
auxiliary requirements. On his view, a system S would be computing a function f iff there
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exists a labelling scheme L and a formal description SPEC of an architecture and an algorithm
specific to that architecture such that the pair (S, L) is an honest model of SPEC. The labelling
scheme designates certain parts of S as label bearers and provides the method for specifying
the label borne by each label-bearing part at any given time. Copeland (1996: p. 338)
exemplifies this labelling scheme by a pair of flip-flops where the voltage across the first one
is 600 mV and across the second one is 100 mV. This pair may be labelled (1, 0) and
accordingly be described as representing the number two in a binary format. Importantly, an
adequate labelling scheme L should not introduce any unintended temporal specifities into the
theory. L should obtain for any Ti and remain applicable throughout the lifetime of the
computing system. But a labelling scheme, which only applies for T1 to Tn and does not
specify what labelling holds prior to T1 or subsequent to Tn, is incomplete (ibid: pp. 348-349).
Moreover, SPEC is a formal description of a certain functional architecture of the system
S and algorithm, which is specific to this architecture14. Whilst algorithms are typically
thought of as independent of the underlying machine that executes them, this dependency
hinges on the primitive operations that are supported by this specific architecture. If, for
instance, the algorithm is such that it sums two addends and saves the result in another data
structure, then the underlying architecture should have at least two registers. For Copeland,
this architecture could be either the concrete or conceptual structure of the computing system
(Copeland, personal communication). Finally, the pair (S, L) is an honest model of SPEC
when the labelling scheme is not ex post facto and the interpretation associated with that
model supports counterfactuals about computation. For instance, if the computing system
supports the ADD operation, then ADD must be part of SPEC even if the system never enters
the state leading to the execution of this operation (ibid: pp. 341-342, 350-351).
14

Copeland describes SPEC in terms of a set of axioms, but nothing of substance hangs upon this axiomatic
method (1996: p. 338).
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Discussion
6.1 Avoiding ambiguity about concrete digital computation
My main argument proceeds as follows:
(P1) There are many accounts of digital computation at our disposal.
(P2) These accounts establish different (but not all irreducibly different) requirements
for a physical system to perform digital computation.
(P3) Therefore, extant accounts of computation are non-equivalent.
(P4) Cognitive capacities are sometimes explained by invoking digital computation
terminology.
(P5) When employing an equivocal interpretation, one needs to commit to an explicit
interpretation (or account).
Therefore, one needs to commit to an explicit account of computation when
explaining cognitive capacities by invoking digital computation terminology.
Specifically, any computational thesis of cognition is unintelligible without a
commitment to a specific account of computation.
The truth of the first premise is evident in the philosophical literature (cf. Piccinini
2007; Shagrir 1999; and Smith 2002, 2010). The accounts reviewed in this paper are only a
handful. Others include the formal symbol manipulation account (Fodor 1975; Pylyshyn
1984), the physical symbol systems account (Newell and Simon 1976), Gandy’s account
(1980) and the mechanistic account of computation (Piccinini 2007)15.
Similarly, premises four and five (at least) seem self-evident. Premise four is hardly
15

For lack of space, not all accounts are examined here in detail. I discuss other accounts elsewhere (Fresco
forthcoming).
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doubtable: computationalists take it for granted (Fodor 1975, Pylyshyn 1984, Newell &
Simon 1976, Marr 1982, van Rooij 2008) and so do some connectionists. Dynamicists do not
subscribe to the computational theory of mind (Van Gelder & Port 1995, Thelen & Smith
1994), yet they reject it without committing to any particular account of computation proper.
They reject it due to the presupposition that digital computation is inherently
representational. I maintain that this presupposition is unjustified, for digital computation
(not computationalism) could be explained without invoking any representational properties
(barring internal representations) by appealing to causal or functional properties instead (see
Fresco 2010 and Piccinini 2008a). As van Rooij (2008: p. 964) rightly points out,
'computation' and 'computationalism' have become associated with the symbolic tradition, but
only sometimes with specific models in this tradition. Some accounts of concrete digital
computation are indeed representational (cf. Smith's reconstructed account, Formal Symbol
Manipulation, Physical Symbol Systems), but others need not be (cf. Copeland 1996,
Chalmers 1995, Piccinini 2007). This simply reinforces the need to commit to a particular
account of computation.
Moreover, premise five calls for disambiguation when there is an equivocation in
terms. When some phenomenon is open to two interpretations or more, we should commit to
one interpretation to avoid ambiguity. For instance, the concept depression has at least two
typical meanings. In the sentence, “The great depression started in most countries in 1929 and
lasted for a long time”, it is clear that ‘depression’ means a long-term downturn in economic
activity. On the other hand, in the sentence, “Long depression leads to making irrational
decisions”, ‘depression’ means something different. Analogously, when one asserts that
hierarchical planning or linguistic tasks, for example, are computational, one ought to commit

23

to a particular account of (digital) computation16. Is it in virtue of executing an algorithm,
formally manipulating symbols, or implementing a TM that cognitive agents engage in
hierarchical planning? Ambiguity may lead to poor communication, which may hinder the
progress in the relevant research field, for it is clearly a collaborative effort.
Furthermore, the commitment to a particular interpretation should be consistent to
avoid further ambiguity. From the two sentences above it follows that irrational decisions
were made in the countries that suffered the great depression in 1929. This conclusion would
only validly follow from its premises, if 'depression' has the same interpretation in both
premises. Otherwise, whilst this conclusion may be plausible, it does not necessarily follow.
This is also known as the fallacy of equivocation. Similarly, if one explains a particular
cognitive capacity in virtue of an explicit account of concrete digital computation, one has to
consistently adhere to that account. An explanation of a linguistic task in virtue of formal
symbol manipulation and then in virtue of algorithm execution ceases to be a coherent story,
since they are not equivalent (see premise three).
Prima facie, it might seem that premise two is self-defeating, but this is not the case. A
possible consequence of all the requirements not being irreducibly different is some overlap
between them. Thus, the requirements that are implied by one account could be reduced to
some of the other requirements17. And if all the requirements could be reduced to a coherent
minimal set of key requirements, then this would constitute a single account of computation.
Premise three would then no longer follow from the preceding premises. However, premise
16
The various accounts of concrete computation offer different perspectives on what a physical computing
system does. But rather than having the same extension (e.g., the operation of a UTM or a personal MacBook),
these accounts end up denoting different classes of computing systems (e.g., the triviality “account” denotes all
physical systems as computing, Algorithm Execution à-la Cummins includes UTMs, but excludes TMs, etc.).
This makes it even more pressing to explicitly specify the appropriate account of computation.
17
An overlap among requirements clearly does not imply reduction from one requirement to another. My intent
here is to address a possible criticism to the effect that premise three would no longer follow as an intermediate
conclusion from its preceding premises.
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two suggests that although some of the requirements may overlap, not all of them do. For
instance, there is an overlap between the fourth key requirement implied by Turing's account
(having the capacity to follow instructions) and the common requirement implied by the
Algorithm Execution account. Still, other requirements such as the situatedness of the
computing system (that is implied by my reconstruction of Smith's account) are not reducible
to any of the other requirements examined in this paper.
Possible challenges to my conclusion might be that some of the key requirements
implied by different accounts could be synthesised or that one could simultaneously subscribe
to two accounts or more. The first challenge may result in sidestepping the demand to commit
to an explicit account. But even if that were the case, such a synthesis would simply yield a
new (possibly adequate!) account of computation. The second challenge needs unpacking. It
can be interpreted in one of two ways. Firstly, it could be interpreted as subscribing to more
than one account simultaneously for explaining different cognitive capacities respectively. I
do not see that as a problem. There is still a need to commit to a particular account for each
relevant cognitive capacity. But this could have some other consequences, such as explaining
cognitive behaviour in a non-unified manner by resorting to a plethora of computational
models.
Secondly, the challenge could be interpreted as subscribing to several accounts
simultaneously, since cognitive explanations by nature span multiple levels. This is consistent
with David Marr's (1982) three levels of analysis. For instance, we could hold that (1)
cognitive computations are inherently representational. At the same time, we could also hold
without being inconsistent that (2) these computations are constrained in terms of any one of
the formalisms of computability, and lastly that (3) they occur in the brain, which is embodied
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and situated in the real world. This is all well and good. Still, as I have argued above, concrete
computation (but perhaps not cognitive computation) could be explained without necessarily
invoking any representational properties (e.g., Copeland's Algorithm Execution account). If
one wishes to commit to a representational account of digital computation, since cognition is
representational, one should firstly justify why computation proper is representational. Also,
subscribing to an account of concrete computation and to a formalism of computability
simultaneously does not introduce any conflict (this point is further discussed below).
6.2

Concrete digital computation is far from being trivial
For Searle (1990: pp. 25-26) the fact that TMs could be physically implemented on

“just about anything” has adverse consequences: every physical system performs digital
computation. Although his account could also be interpreted as dealing with FSA
computation, it is not confined to FSA and is just as applicable to TMs. Searle argues that if
we accept Turing’s account and define computation in terms of assigning 0’s and 1’s, then
every system is a digital computer, since it could be described in terms of 0’s and 1’s. Thus,
as long as the system is both sufficiently complex and apprised of by a knower – it computes!
This is probably not what Turing had in mind when he introduced his abstract machines (a
digestive system could also be described in terms of 0’s and 1’s). David Chalmers (1995: pp.
395-396, 1996: pp. 331-332) adds that the implementation relation between abstract automata
and physical systems is objective and is not relative to a knower. The states of Searle's wall
will (almost) certainly not satisfy the relevant reliable state-transition rules, for his wall (and
probably any other wall) does not possess the required causal organisation to compute18.

18
Chalmers (1995, 1996) argues that every physical system implements a simple FSA with a single internal
state, for instance. Instead he recommends using the formalism of combinatorial state automata (CSA), and
argues that the states in most computational formalisms have a combinatorial structure. The conditions for
implementing a given complex computation using CSAs will be typically sufficiently rigorous to block arbitrary
state transition mappings à-la Searle.
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Fortunately, Searle’s account could be resisted, for one thing, since it cannot explain
certain counterfactuals, which must be true about computing systems. As Block (2002: pp.
77-78) points out, a computing system should allow all the possible computations, which the
system could have performed, rather than just the one it actually performs. Suppose that
Searle’s wall computes “0 + 1 = 1”. For this wall to be deemed a computing system, it is not
enough to have the physical states corresponding to the states ‘0’ and ‘1’ followed by a
physical state corresponding to ‘1’ (representing the output). It must also allow all the other
possible computations that could have been performed by a computing system. For instance,
had the ‘0’ input been replaced by a ‘1’ input, the output would have been replaced by a ‘2’.
Additionally, Searle’s metaphysics of computation (SM) could give rise to some
absurd consequences. For example, if we accepted SM and the theory of complexity (TC)
then some unavoidable absurd consequences would follow. One surprising consequence is
that there could be a knower arguing that the complexity classes P19 and NP20 are equivalent,
since Searle argues that computation is knower-relative. He could argue that a big enough
wall could compute the Travelling Salesperson Problem (TSP)21 in P. This would be the case
under a description in which each state transition corresponded to adding an edge to the
optimal route, and no more than (the order of) n such state transitions were needed for
constructing the optimal route through n cities. The knower could simply “know” what the
optimal route is (for a given input), for SM does not support counterfactuals about
computation and there exists some arbitrary description under which the wall computes TSP
19
An algorithm is said to be P or polynomial time if its execution time is upper bounded by a polynomial in the
size of the input for the algorithm, i.e., T(n) = O(nk) for a constant kN
20
Formally, a language L is in the class NP (non-deterministic polynomial time) iff L is accepted by a nondeterministic TM, which operates in polynomial time (Karp 1972: p. 91).
21
TSP involves determining whether there is some possible route through the nodes (cities) in a graph that
enables each city to be visited exactly once. The question is whether this graph has a set of edges that connect
the nodes into a single cycle with each node appearing exactly once. All ways to solve this problem require
trying essentially all cycles and computing their total weight (Hopcroft et al 2001: pp. 419-420).
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in P. And if TSP turned out to be in P, it would follow that P = NP (Hopcroft et al 2001: pp.
419-423). However, this consequence is precipitated, as it is one of the deepest open
questions in mathematics and computer science. If we reject this consequence as
unacceptable, then SM must be rejected as false (stipulating that TC is accepted to be true).
Although Putnam-triviality escapes some of the problems that Searle-triviality faces, it
still faces some serious problems concerning physical computation. Putnam's account focuses
more on the mathematical realm and ignores some physical constraints that unavoidably apply
to concrete computation. A central principle in thermodynamics states that a finite amount of
space has finite entropy. Physical systems with finite entropy can only perform a finite
number of operations (Penrose 1989: pp. 391-417). It follows from these two constraints that
any finite physical system (such as ordinary open systems) cannot perform infinitely many
computations. So, Putnam-triviality can be resisted in the physical world.
Moreover, his principles of continuity and of non-cyclical behaviour only alleviate
some of the problems for trivial computation. Physical computing systems may exhibit spatial
discontinuities and yet we can determine which computation has been performed when an
error occurs. Provided that the physical conditions under which the error has occurred are
known, a theory of error allows us to analyse it. Putnam does indeed exclude physical systems
that exhibit spatial discontinuities or chaotic behaviours. But, even if the physical conditions
are known, Putnam-triviality does not allow us to predict in some possible systems whether
they will exhibit such behaviours, and violate the principle of continuity. If a physical system
S violated that principle, then S would not compute F. If S did not violate the principle of
continuity, we still cannot predict whether S trivially computes F. Thus, Putnam-triviality
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faces a Kripke-Wittgenstein problem22 (Buechner 2008: p. 131).
Furthermore, the principle of non-cyclical behaviour also excludes many control
constructs, which are commonplace in programming languages, thus excluding many
computations. It prohibits a physical system from having a duplicated physical state and
entering the same maximal state twice23. But this simply rules out computations, which
contain looping on a particular condition or GOTO statements. For example, suppose that a
physical system S1 actualises a computation that contains a loop statement, which keeps
running until a signal is received from another system S2. The signal from S2 is the exit
condition for the loop statement in S1. If S1 does not change its computational state whilst running
the loop statement, it will be excluded by the principle of non-cyclical behaviour, since S1 re-

enters the same maximal state.
Additionally, Putnam's account does not support some counterfactuals that are
relevant to concrete computation. Putnam considers the class of counterfactuals of the form
”if a physical system had not been in state A, it would not have transited to state B”. But what
is required is not just that the state A is followed by state B in a given time period, as he
suggests. Rather, there must exist a reliable counterfactual supporting relation between the
states. It must obtain that if the physical system were to be in state A, it would transit to state
B. This condition must also be satisfied for every transition, which is specified in the machine
table, and not only for those whose antecedent states occur in a certain time period. Putnam's
account does not meet this stronger requirement (Chalmers 1995: pp. 398-399).
22

A Kripke-Wittgenstein problem is an extension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's rule-following problem. Saul Kripke
asks what determines objectively whether one means plus rather than quus. He introduces quus as the addition
function (typically known as plus) for all sums below a certain computed threshold, but diverges for higher
numbers. Traditional usage of plus soon becomes susceptible to many quus-like interpretations. So the
application of plus is no longer governed by a strictly defined rule.
23

Prohibiting a system from entering the same computational state twice does not confine Putnam's account to
FSA computation, but it does render it inapplicable to cyclic FSA, cyclic TMs and those that must use their tape.
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On Smith’s view, the trivialisation consequence of Turing’s account is interesting
indeed: it is reduced to a physical theory, specifically “a mathematical theory of causality”
(Smith 2002: p. 42; 2010: 23). He argues that Turing’s theory is not and can never be
successful in deriving even an abstract notion of effective computability and fails as a theory
of computation. Computation is constrained by and substantiated by physical connections
between the computing system and the physical world. Classical computability theory is,
according to Smith, a general theory of the physical world: how hard it is for one physical
configuration to change into another by means of either scanning and writing symbols or
some other finite physical processes (Smith 2010: p. 27). Instead, on a reconstructive reading
of Smith, a computing system has to satisfy the three above requirements, which imply that it
is representational as well as effective.
Additionally, Smith (2010: pp. 29-31) asserts that UTMs as a means of analysing
equivalences of various computing systems are at best misleading. UTMs obscure our
understanding of the powers and physical limitations of computing systems. This also leads to
the unjustified assumption that TM controllers, CPUs etc. are concrete entities, whilst
instruction tables, programs and so on are not. But once this assumption is rejected and
programs too are acknowledged as being concrete configurations of marks or symbols, the
conceptual boundary between CPUs and programs begins to fade. By the same token, when
analysing the equivalence of one TM to another, not only should the “machines” be
compared, but so should the respective programs executed on these machines.
On the other hand, Copeland (1996: p. 335) maintains that classical computability
theory provides necessary conditions for distinguishing computing systems from noncomputing systems. To uphold the sufficiency of Turing’s theory, he argues that a distinction
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should be drawn between standard and nonstandard interpretations of computation (ibid: pp.
346-348). On a nonstandard interpretation of a theory the intended meanings of the terms of
the theory are not respected. For instance, on a nonstandard interpretation (as Searle’s) of the
axiomatic specification of the physical system and the computation it performs, it might turn
out that walls, clocks and buckets of water are indeed computing systems.
Also, on a nonstandard interpretation à-la Searle’s, all the alleged computational
activity occurs outside the wall, whilst interpreting the molecular movements of the wall as
computational and assigning the labelling scheme ex post facto. Searle’s labelling scheme is
incomplete, for he imposes a scheme that only applies to a particular time interval (rather than
being applicable throughout the lifetime of the computing wall). Additionally, future
computational states cannot be predicted and counterfactuals are not supported. When
extending Turing’s account by adding Copeland’s honest model requirement, which preserves
the non-arbitrariness of computation, these difficulties are addressed. Copeland's extended
Turing account then provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing
computing systems from non-computing systems (Copeland, personal communication).
Although some of the key requirements identified above may overlap, they still reveal
sufficient dissimilarity between the accounts examined. Even when excluding Putnam and
Searle's trivialisation of digital computation, the three remaining accounts imply several
unique requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation. The first three key
requirements implied by Turing's account are the basis for any actual algorithmic
computation. An actual algorithmic computation is a spatiotemporal activity, as opposed to
just being a mathematical entity (Israel 2002: p. 190). And any system, in the course of this
activity, which cannot distinguish between different symbols, cannot write symbols to
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memory or change its states, is certainly not running an efficacious algorithm.
Moreover, the four requirements, which are implied by Turing’s account, overlap with
the prime requirement of the Algorithm Execution account. Turing’s fourth key requirement
(the capacity to follow instructions) simply ensures that the system can indeed execute (or act
in accordance with) an algorithm. Some may argue that only UTMs execute programs (or
algorithms), but not standard TMs (cf. Piccinini 2008a). Still, this simply calls for a further
distinction between a program-controlled computing system (i.e., a special purpose TM) and a
stored-program computing system (i.e., a general purpose UTM). The former is hardprogrammed (or hardwired) for a special purpose computation by modifying the machine
head’s internal wiring (e.g., by means of a plug-board arrangement). The latter is softprogrammed by inscribing the machine's instructions onto its tape (Copeland 1997: p. 691).
But the Algorithm Execution account adds further requirements, which are not
explicitly required by Turing's account. In the spirit of Turing, Copeland (1997: p. 696)
defines an algorithm as "any collection of rules or instructions that determines the behavior of
a computing machine". He introduces the existence of a labelling scheme and the honest
model requirements to successfully block absurd consequences that follow from trivialising
the notion of digital computation (Copeland 1996).
Moreover, Smith (2002; 2010) insists on further requirements that are usually ignored
by traditional accounts of computation. On his view, computing systems are essentially
situated in their environment, rather than merely operating in isolation, where their
situatedness is merely contingent. Though the behaviour of computing systems is indeed
effective, it is not limited to the physical boundaries of the system. Incidentally, Wells’ view
bears resemblance to Smith’s in relation to the situatedness of computing systems. Wells also
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argues that UTMs (and computers) are embedded in an environment, which constitutes part of
the TM’s architecture (Wells 1998: p. 280). According to Smith, computing systems are
representational and as such they stand in semantic relations to distal states of affairs.
6.3

Accounts of concrete computation and formalisms of computability
Finally, there is no question whether mathematical formalisms of computability are

adequate analyses of computability, but they are of the wrong kind to explain concrete
computing systems. In what follows, I argue that formalisms of computability may provide the
mathematical tools required for determining the plausibility of computational level theories.
Yet, any particular formalism does not specify the relationship between abstract and concrete
computation. It is at the physical level the algorithm is specified and bound by the
implementing physical system. So stipulating that any complete account of a physical
phenomenon must also consider its physical implementation, an explicit account of concrete
computation has to be specified for a complete account of computing systems.
This argument follows almost immediately from Marr's three levels of analysis. If his
explanatory model is interpreted as a top down methodology24, then the top level provides an
extensional account of what is computed, the middle level specifies how it is computed, and
the bottom level describes the actual implementation. The top/computational level
characterises the mathematical (or cognitive) input/output function being computed. The
middle/algorithmic level specifies how the system computes this function and is consistent
with various formalisms of computability. The implementational/bottom level shows how the
system works in terms of the physical system and this is certainly where accounts of concrete

24

This conventional interpretation has had its fair share of criticisms (see for example, Bell et al 2001: pp. 209212; Dennett 1998: pp. 249-260; Shagrir 2010). For my purposes, suffice to say that Marr identifies the top level
as computational. But it is his algorithmic level that is on a par with formalisms of computability, and the
implementational level that describes physical computation.
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computation fit in comfortably.
Indeed, formalisms of computability may provide the mathematical tools required for
evaluating the plausibility of computational level theories. Since our cognitive capacities are
constrained by the fact that we are finite systems with limited resources for computation,
some argue that classical computability theory and complexity theory could assist cognitive
science by providing theoretical constraints on the set of feasible computational level theories.
An underlying assumption of this view is that a cognitive capacity involves the effective
computation of a specific input/output function F (i.e,, a set of ordered pairs), which given an
initial/input state i, realises a final/output state o = F(i) as specified by function F: I→O. If a
computational level theory of a cognitive capacity is assumed veridical, then further attempts
can be made by scientists to analyse it at the next levels of abstraction, which Marr called the
algorithmic and the implementational levels (van Rooij 2008: pp. 939-941).
Once a particular mathematical formalism was chosen to evaluate the feasibility of a
computational level theory, the next level of abstraction has to be taken into account, namely
the physical level. Each one of the mathematical formalisms of computability provides a
definition of the set of allowable operations used to compute functions and their associated
computational costs by implication. So in order to determine the computational resources that
are required, the particular formalism needs to be specified (though some complexity
distinctions, such as between P and NP running time are insensitive to the exact formalism of
computability). But even then, the particular formalism does not specify the relationship
between abstract and concrete computation (in Chalmers 1995, he argues that it is a relation
of isomorphism between the formal structure of the former and the causal structure of the
latter).
The next task then is choosing the appropriate computability formalism for an analysis
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at the algorithmic level. Daniel Dennett (1998: p. 232) suggests that an analysis at the
computational level “might be nothing more that the demand for enough rigour and precision
to set the problem for the next level down, Marr's algorithmic level”. If we are to agree with
Marr that problems must first be faced at the computational level (ibid: p. 231), then we
cannot avoid questions regarding algorithmic and concrete computation at the next levels.
Some formalisms of computability, such as TMs and lambda calculus, specify the algorithm
to be employed to compute the computational level function, whereas others, recursive
functions, for instance, do not. The appropriate formalism provides an algorithmic level
explanation of how ordered pairings at the computational level are computed. Still, there
could be many algorithms, which correspond to any particular computational level function,
that could be in turn implemented in any number of ways.
So, it is only at the implementational level that the algorithm has been specified and
constrained by the particular physical system. This is where an account of concrete
computation has to be specified explicitly, as I have argued above. The appropriate account of
concrete computation could be used to bind the algorithmic level (e.g., TM, lambda calculus,
etc.) and the physical level together to explain the actual computation taking place. This also
shows that there is no conflict in subscribing simultaneously to both a formalism of
computability and an account of concrete computation.
Whereas the Algorithm Execution account and Smith's reconstructed account also
make provisions for the algorithmic level, Turing's analysis clearly does not account for
spatiotemporal considerations. The Algorithm Execution account à-la Copeland tries to meet
the objection to Turing's analysis as necessary but insufficient (Copeland 1996: p. 335). He
leaves Turing's analysis at the algorithmic level unchanged, but extends it to be closely
coupled with the implementational level in considering the formal description of the
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computing system, the algorithm executed and the supporting architecture. Smith's
reconstructed account puts most emphasis on the algorithmic and implementational levels in
explaining the crossing of boundaries between the abstract algorithms and the physical realworld computing systems. Lastly, Turing's analysis is aligned with the algorithmic level in
accordance with the four requirements specified above. But his analysis of the
implementational level is lacking, for it overlooks spatiotemporal considerations.
This point was recognised by Gandy (1980: pp. 124-125), who argued that concrete
computation requires an independent analysis that considers the limits of physical
computation. He postulated explicit physical constraints on computing systems, namely a
lower bound on the size of distinguishable atomic components of the computing system, and
an upper bound on velocity of propagation of information. These restrictive conditions are
motivated by purely physical considerations (Sieg 2008: p. 147): the uncertainty principle of
quantum mechanics justifies a lower bound on the size of atomic components, and the theory
of special relativity yields an upper bound on signal propagation25. Interestingly, Smith
(2008), who criticises Turing’s theory as being “a mathematical theory of causality”, praises
Gandy for recognising the importance of physical constraints in computing systems and
showing that absolute computability results depended on the character of the implementing
physical system.
Conclusion
A new account of concrete computation was not offered here. Two arguments were
25

Copeland and Shagrir (2007) object to the claim that all the finiteness constraints are motivated by physical
considerations, as there are physical systems that satisfy Gandy's principles, are finite in the physical sense, but
are (the controversial) hypercomputers. Their objection is motivated by an ambiguity in the term ‘deterministic’
(ibid: p. 228). Some hypercomputers are not 'Gandy deterministic', for there is no such thing as the previous state
that uniquely determines the configuration of its halting state, yet they invoke no random or stochastic elements.
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given instead. The main argument was that well-known accounts of concrete computation
entail sufficiently distinct requirements for a physical system to compute, justifying the
demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of concrete
computation. The second one was that whilst mathematical formalisms of computability may
play an informative role in cognitive science, they do not specify the relationship between
abstract and concrete computation, and are of the wrong kind to explain the phenomenon of
concrete computation.
But surprisingly despite the apparent straightforwardness of these arguments, all too
often their implied morals are ignored by philosophers and cognitive scientists. The notions of
computation simpliciter and digital computation in particular are employed without much
awareness of what they mean exactly. At times, these accounts are even used interchangeably
as though they were equivalent (when they are not even extensionally equivalent). No less
problematic is the appeal to formalisms of computability (most commonly to TMs) when the
explanandum is a physical phenomenon and its physicality is central to its explanans. If we
take cognition to be a physical phenomenon and try to explain it computationally, we should
say explicitly what we mean by computation.
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